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Unlawful Detainer Statute (2005) 
Pertinent Provisions 
UTAH CODE 
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS 
CHAPTER 36. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
§ 78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, after 
the expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, 
whether established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall be terminated 
without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly or other periodic rent 
reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the end of any month or period, in 
cases where the owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or 
more prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring him to quit the premises at 
the expiration of that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of the premises after the expiration 
of a notice of not less than five days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after default in the payment of any rent 
and after a notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the 
detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after service, which notice 
may be served at any time after the rent becomes due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or commits 
or permits waste on the premises, or when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the 
premises, or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any nuisance, including 
nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after service upon him of a three 
days' notice to quit; or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform 
any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property is held, other than those 
previously mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the performance of the 
conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon him and upon any subtenant in 
actual occupation of the premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within three 
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days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, any 
mortgagee of the term, or other person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or 
covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the covenants and conditions of the 
lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined under Title 57, Chapter 16, 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3 (l)(d) are not applicable to nuisance 
actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78- 38-16 only. 
Laws 1951, c. 58, § l;Laws 1981, c. 160, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 137, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 101, § l;Laws 
1992, c. 141, §2. 
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§ 78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant 
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is one in the actual 
occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, shall be made a party defendant in the 
proceeding, except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be 
nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made a party defendant; but when it 
appears that any of the parties served with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment 
shall be rendered against those parties. 
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the service of any notice as 
provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the 
action. All persons who enter under the tenant after the commencement of the action shall be bound by 
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action. 
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant only in an abatement by 
eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided in Section 78-38-13. 
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 141, §4. 
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§ 78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff—Alternative remedies 
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may 
execute and file a possession bond. The bond may be in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, 
certified funds, or a property bond executed by two persons who own real property in the state and who 
are not parties to the action. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the probable amount 
of costs of suit and damages which may result to the defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. 
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs and 
damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall notify the defendant that he has filed 
a possession bond. This notice shall be served in the same manner as service of summons and shall 
inform the defendant of all of the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a 
possession bond under Subsection (1): 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon nonpayment of rent or utilities, the 
existing contract shall remain in force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within 
three days of the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, utility charges, any 
late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as provided in the rental agreement. 
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he executes and files a counter bond in the form of a 
corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property bond executed by two persons who own 
real property in the state and who are not parties to the action. The form of the bond is at the 
defendant's option. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file the 
bond prior to the expiration of three days from the date he is served with notice of the filing of 
plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the probable amount 
of costs of suit and actual damages that may result to the plaintiff if the defendant has improperly 
withheld possession. The court shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's 
total bond. 
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a hearing to be held prior to the expiration of three 
days from the date the defendant is served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond. 
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a remedy under Subsection (2) within the required 
time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be granted an order of restitution. The constable of the 
precinct or the sheriff of the county where the property is situated shall return possession of the property 
to the plaintiff promptly. 
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2)(c), and if the court rules after the hearing 
that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return 
possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the hearing the court allows the defendant to remain in 
possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the parties, the court shall require the 
defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection (2)(b). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues 
between the parties can be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court shall, upon 
adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the merits. 
Laws 1981, c. 160, § 4; Laws 1983, c. 209, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 123, § 3. 
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§ 78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent—Immediate enforcement—Treble 
damages 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the 
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of the premises as provided in Section 78-36-10.5. If 
the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of 
the lease or agreement under which the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the 
judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall 
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and 
proved at trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38- 9 through 78-38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the 
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are 
provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of the rent, execution upon the 
judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be 
issued and enforced immediately. 
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 160, § 5; Laws 1987, c. 123, § 4; Laws 1992, c. 141, § 5; Laws 
1994, c. 225, §2. 
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§ 78-36-123. Definitions 
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the premises with intent to 
deprive the tenant of such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the same meaning as landlord 
under common law and the statutes of this state. 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent from the premises, and the 
tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than 
the presence of the tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent from the premises, and the 
tenant fails to pay rent when due and the tenant's personal property has been removed from the 
dwelling unit and there is no reasonable evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises. 
Laws 1981, c. 160, § 7. Current through end of 2005 First Special Session 
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Unlawful Detainer Statute (2007) 
Pertinent Provisions 
UTAH CODE 
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS 
CHAPTER 36. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
§ 78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant 
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, a lease signer, and subtenant if there is one in the 
actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, shall be made a party defendant in the 
proceeding, except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be 
nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made a party defendant; but when it 
appears that any of the parties served with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment 
shall be rendered against those parties. 
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the service of any notice as 
provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the 
action. All persons who enter under the tenant after the commencement of the action shall be bound by 
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action. 
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant only in an abatement by 
eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided in Section 78-38-13. 
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 141, $4: Laws 2007, c. 360, $ 2, eff. April 30, 2007. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 104-36-7. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2007, c. 360, in subsec. (1) inserted "a lease signer," 
Page 2 
§ 78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent—Immediate enforcement—Treble 
damages 
(l)(a) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. 
(b) A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of the premises 
as provided in Section 78-36-10.5. 
(c) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or 
covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property is held, or after default in the payment of 
rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(d)(i) A forfeiture under Subsection (l)(c) does not release a defendant from any obligation for 
payments on a lease for the remainder of the lease's term. 
(ii) Subsection (l)(d)(i) does not change any obligation on either party to mitigate damages. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall 
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and 
proved at trial; 
(d) the amounts due under the contract, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment 
of amounts due under the contract; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38- 9 through 78-38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the 
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(e), and for reasonable attorney fees. 
(4)(a) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer, execution upon the judgment shall be issued 
immediately after the entry of the judgment. 
(b) In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately. 
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 160, § 5; Laws 1987, c. 123, § 4; Laws 1992, c. 141, § 5; Laws 
1994, c. 225, § 2; Laws 2007, c. 360, § 6, eff. April 30, 2007. 
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Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 104-36-10. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2007, c. 360, inserted subsec. designators (l)(a) through (c) and inserted subsec. (l)(d); rewrote 
subsec. (2)(d) which read: "the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in 
the payment of rent; and"; in subsec. (3) substituted "(2)(e)" for "(2)(c) "attorney" for "attorney's" and 
at the end deleted ", if they are provided for in the lease or agreement"; inserted subsec. designators 
(4)(a) and (b) and in subsec. (4)(a) following "unlawful detainer" deleted "after default in the payment of 
the rent". 
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UTAH CODE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; MOTIONS, MEMORANDA, HEARINGS, ORDERS, 
OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S ORDER 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an answer to 
a cross claim, if the answer contains a cross claim; a third party complaint, if a person who was 
not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a 
third party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may 
order a reply to an answer or a third party answer. 
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made 
during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made in 
accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with particularity 
the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought. 
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order to show cause shall 
be made only for enforcement of an existing order or for sanctions for violating an existing 
order. An application for an order to show cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to 
show cause to believe a party has violated a court order. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or ex parte 
motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days after service of 
the motion and supporting memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum 
in opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, the moving party 
may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the 
memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A 
party may attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave of the 
court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court. The 
court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a 
showing of good cause. 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a statement 
of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact shall 
be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as 
Page 2 
affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is 
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding 
party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a verbatim 
restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate 
statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, 
the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts 
set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of contents 
and a table of authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents cited 
in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a "Request 
to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date on which the 
motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply 
memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a 
request, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a hearing in the 
motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A request for hearing shall be 
separately identified in the caption of the document containing the request. The court shall grant 
a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action or 
any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to the 
motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided. 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in writing, 
not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in the same 
manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made 
without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or 
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the 
court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or 
unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the 
court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's 
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decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party 
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon 
expiration of the time to object. 
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate documents 
and shall not incorporate any matter by reference. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a court 
commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A party may object to the 
recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner as filing a motion within ten days 
after the recommendation is made in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter 
under advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may 
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
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RULE 8. GENERAL RULES OF PLEADINGS 
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief 
to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be 
demanded. 
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each 
claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he 
shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the 
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of 
an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the 
remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith t6 controvert all the averments of the 
preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or 
paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or 
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he 
may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, 
injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute 
of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. 
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a 
defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a 
proper designation. 
(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the 
responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or 
permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of 
pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or 
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or 
more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be 
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
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alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has 
regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All 
statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
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RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant 
shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is 
complete within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is 
complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an 
answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a 
counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered 
by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The 
service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time 
is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading 
does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be 
served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the 
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join 
an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if 
a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or 
more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after 
the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the 
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the 
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense 
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a 
motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time 
as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided 
in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
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(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of 
this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in 
subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, 
unless the court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a 
responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a 
responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details 
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after 
notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the 
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no 
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days 
after the service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the 
other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule 
and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to 
be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or 
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by 
motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of 
failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is 
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) 
that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if 
made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that 
may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any 
motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of 
this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to 
furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon 
hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order 
the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such 
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costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any 
officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered 
within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an 
order dismissing the action. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
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RULE 19. JOINDER OF PERSONS NEEDED FOR JUST ADJUDICATION 
(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose 
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined 
as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those 
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of 
his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If 
he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper 
case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render 
the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in 
Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity 
and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be 
dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered 
by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be 
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions 
in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or 
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, 
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the 
names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who 
are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
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RULE 20. PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES 
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to 
relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to 
all of them will arise in the action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there 
is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or 
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any 
question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant 
need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may 
be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against 
one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities. 
(b) Separate Trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a party from being 
embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party against whom he asserts no 
claim and who asserts no claim against him, and may order separate trials or make other orders 
to prevent delay or prejudice. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
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RULE 54. JUDGMENTS; COSTS 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from 
which an appeal lies A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, 
or the record of prior proceedings Judgments shall state whether they are entered upon trial, 
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative, and, unless otherwise directed by the court, a 
judgment shall not include any matter by reference 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final 
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for 
the entry of judgment In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if 
the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings It may be given for or against one or 
more of several claimants, and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves 
(c)(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed 
in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment 
(d) Costs. 
(d)( 1) To whom awarded Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of 
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs, provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause Costs against the state of Utah, its 
officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law 
(d)(2) How assessed The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of 
judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with 
the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items 
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are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of 
the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of 
judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment 
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, 
if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have 
been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount 
thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the 
register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
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RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted 
or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or 
any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered 
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered 
upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of 
the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, 
shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the 
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in 
the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a 
response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
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continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had 
or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party 
presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing 
of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
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UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
RULE 24. BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings 
and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or 
order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the 
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears 
immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, 
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation 
is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim 
with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone 
will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the 
course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to 
the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a 
succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
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(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved 
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the 
request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief 
unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of 
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in 
the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all 
cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part 
of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(l 1)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination 
of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or document 
subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement 
of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. 
The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant 
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new 
matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed 
except with leave of the appellate court. 
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(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments 
to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It 
promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or 
the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,1 
"the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original 
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of 
published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of 
each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered 
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to 
exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility 
of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the 
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of 
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions 
of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, 
paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a 
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court 
otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, 
and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the 
appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in 
the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-
Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief 
of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good 
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this 
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rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional 
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days 
before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief 
is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief 
for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal 
number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or 
denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one 
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of 
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part 
of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the 
attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before 
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the 
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state 
the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. 
Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the 
offending lawyer. 
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LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
CAREY A. SEAGER (9463) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)363-5000 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
RAY HUNTING, ) JUDGMENT AND FINAL ORDER 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC, a ) 
Limited Liability Company ) Case No. 050800484 
) 
Defendant. ) Judge John R. Anderson 
) 
On November 1, 2006, this Court entered its Ruling and Order partially granting 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment because: (1) the parties did not have a written lease 
agreement; (2) the Plaintiff was entitled to unilaterally increase the Defendant's monthly rent 
from $2,000.00 per month to $7,500.00 per month as part of the resulting month-to-month 
tenancy; (3) the Defendant had received notice and was aware of the foregoing rent increase; (4) 
the Defendant was served with and received a notice to pay or vacate on September 16, 2005; (5) 
the Defendant did not thereafter pay the increased amount of rent or vacate but continued paying 
only $2,000.00 per month; and (6) by not paying the increased monthly rent or vacating the 
T % 
% > 
^ 
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premises, Defendant was in unlawful detainer of the property. The Court also denied the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss but reserved the issue of Plaintiff s damages for a future hearing. 
After the Court's November 1, 2006, Ruling and Order, Defendant filed a Motion to 
Reconsider the Court's November lsl Ruling and Order. After receipt of briefing from the 
parties' counsel, the Court scheduled and entertained oral argument regarding Defendant's 
Motion to Reconsider on January 30, 2007. At the conclusion of oral argument, the Court issued 
its ruling from the bench and denied the Defendant's Motion to Reconsider. The Court also re-
affirmed the partial summary judgment it had granted in Plaintiffs favor in the Court's 
November 1, 2006, Ruling and Order on the basis that Defendant was in unlawful detainer. On 
February 1, 2007, the Court issued its written Ruling and Order in which it formally denied 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and formally affirmed the Court's partial summary judgment 
in Plaintiffs favor as determined in the November 1, 2006, Ruling and Order. 
On April 6, 2007, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of 
Damages with the same accompanied by a Supporting Memorandum. After receiving briefing 
from both parties' counsel, the Coun issued its Ruling dated May 31, 2007, denying Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. 
On May 3, 2007, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Award Damages and for Entry of Final 
Judgment, which was accompanied by a supporting memorandum, the affidavit of Plaintiff s 
expert witness, Paul Throndsen, MAI, and the affidavits of Plaintiff, Ray Hunting and his co-
counsel, Phillip W. Dyer. In response to Plaintiffs Motion, Defendant did not submit any expert 
opinion or affidavit of any expert witness. On May 17, 2007, Defendant also filed Motions to 
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Strike the Affidavits of Ray Hunting and Phillip W. Dyer. Both of the foregoing Motions were 
fully briefed and appropriate Notices to Submit for Decision were filed with the Court Clerk. 
After considering the parties' submissions and pleadings, the Court entered its Ruling on 
July 2, 2007, granting, in part, Plaintiffs Motion to Award Damages and for Entry of Final 
Judgment and granting, in part, Defendant's Motion to Strike. In the Court's Railing, the Court 
ordered the Plaintiffs counsel to prepare a proposed order and final judgment consistent with the 
Court's Ruling and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Award Damages is granted, in part, and Plaintiff is hereby 
awarded a judgment against Defendant in the total sum of $88,174.50, which is calculated as 
follows: 
A. Unpaid rent from September of 2005 through December of 2006 in the 
amount of $88,000.00. 
B. Treble damages - $0.00. 
C. Costs in the amount of $ 174.50. 
Interest shall accrue on foregoing judgment at the current judgment rate of 6.99 % per 
annum until such time as the judgment and accrued interest is/are paid in full. 
2. The Defendant's Motion to Strike is granted, in part, as follows: 
A. The Court hereby strikes the following paragraphs in the May 2, 2007, 
Affidavit of Ray Hunting: 1) paragraph four in its entirety; and 2) 
paragraph five in its entirety. 
B. The Court hereby strikes the following paragraphs in the May 2, 2007, 
Affidavit of Phillip W. Dyer: 1) paragraphs three in its entirety; 2) 
paragraph four in its entirety; and 3) the final sentence of paragraph six. 
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The remainder of Defendant's Motion to Strike is denied. 
3. Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment on Order Regarding Attorney's Fees 
Awarded Pursuant to Court Ruling and Order dated October 17, 2006, is rendered moot by the 
Satisfaction of Judgment Regarding Attorney's Fees filed with the Court on June 18, 2007. 
4. Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Final Judgment is hereby granted and this Order 
shall constitute the final, appealable judgment/order in this matter. Any Motion not heretofore 
explicitly granted or denied is hereby denied. 
UP DATED this 
Approved as to form: 
*E£ JOHNHR. ANDERSON 
Eighth District Court Judge 
Daniel S. Sam, Esq. 
Williaim L. Reynolds, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
JuJL 31, 2cx>l 
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Exhibit E 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT \ % / fj> ><$> 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ > 
RAY HUNTING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, L.L.C., 
Defendant. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 050800484 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: 
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment on Order Regarding 
Attorney's Fees Awarded Pursuant to Court Ruling and Order Dated 
October 17, 2006, filed May 03, 2007; 2} Plaintiff's Motion to 
Award Damages and for Entry of Final Judgment, filed May 03, 
2007; 3) Defendant's Motion to Strike Hunting Affidavit, filed 
May 17, 2007; 4) Defendant's Motion to Strike Dyer Affidavit, 
filed May 17, 2007. 
I. Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment on Order Regarding 
Attorney's Fees Awarded Pursuant to Court Ruling and Order Dated 
October 17, 2006 
It appears to the Court, from a review of the record, that 
the October 17, 2006 order of the Court awarding the Plaintiff 
$1,000.00 as attorney fees has already been observed. On June 
18, 2007, the Defendant filed a Satisfaction of Judgment Regard-
ing Attorney Fees which states that the $1,000.00 award has been 
"fully paid, satisfied and discharged by check number 5152." 
Therefore, the Plaintiff's motion on this issue is now mooted. 
o-\s 
II. Plaintiff's Motion to Award Damages and for Entry of Final 
Judgment 
The Plaintiff's motion requests an order awarding the 
Plaintiff the following: 
a) $88,000.00 for unpaid rent from September 2005 through 
December 2006; 
b) $264,000.00 as treble damages based upon Defendant's un-
lawful detainer of the subject property; 
c) $174.50 for costs and court fees; and 
d) final judgment based upon the aforementioned amounts. 
Based upon the prior rulings of the Court, it is clear that 
the Plaintiff is entitled to the $88,000.00 for unpaid rent. 
The Court has previously found that: 1) these parties did not 
have a written lease; 2) that the Plaintiff was entitled to uni-
laterally increase the Defendant's rent as part of the resulting 
month-to-month tenancy; 3) that the Defendant was aware of the 
rent increase; 4) that the Defendant received a notice to pay or 
vacate; 5) that the Defendant did not pay the increased amount 
of rent, but continued paying only $2,000.00 per month; and 6) 
that by not paying the increased amount and not vacating the De-
fendant was in unlawful detainer of the property. The increased 
rent amount went into effect in September 2005. It appears that 
the Defendant has vacated the property as of December 2006. As 
a result, the Defendant failed to pay the increased amount of 
rent for 16 months. Sixteen (16) months at $5,500.00 per month 
(the difference between what the Plaintiff expected, $7,500.00 
per month, and what the Defendant actually paid, $2,000.00 per 
month) results in $88,000.00 of unpaid rent. Therefore, based 
upon the foregoing, the Court hereby awards the Plaintiff 
$88,000.00 for unpaid rent. 
The more difficult question is whether the Plaintiff is en-
titled to the requested $264,000.00 as treble damages for the 
Defendant's unlawful detainer. First, there is no question that 
even if the Defendant had vacated the premises after receiving 
the Plaintiff's three-day notice to pay or vacate (or any time 
thereafter, for that matter), this Court would not have been in 
a position to restore possession of the subject property to the 
Plaintiff. The fact of the matter is that another party, PRS, 
Inc.,1 was still arguably in possession of the premises or had 
legal right to the premises based upon a lease between the Cor-
poration and the Plaintiff. The rights and obligations of the 
parties to that lease agreement have never been brought before 
this Court for adjudication and the Court currently lacks juris-
diction to render a decision on those issues. It is for these 
reason that the Court twice declined to issue an order of resti-
tution or the subject property to the Plaintiff in this case, 
even after the Defendant was found to be in unlawful detainer of 
the subject property. 
The Plaintiff urges the Court to presume that PRS, Inc. had 
abandoned the lease. See Plaintiff's Reply in Supp. of Mot. to 
Award Damages 6 n.10 and 7 n.15. Plaintiff then states that 
"Plaintiff is not asking this Court to adjudicate the rights of 
PRS Corporation . . ." I_cL at 8. The Court will not presume 
that PRS, Inc. abandoned the lease without having PRS, Inc. as a 
party to the suit. Therefore, the presumption of abandonment 
will not be entertained, or relied upon, by the Court. 
Instead, the Court will hold to the position it has taken 
previously in this case. Even if PRS, LLC had vacated the prem-
ises, the Plaintiff would have been unable to retake possession 
of the subject property until lawfully dealing with PRS, Inc.'s 
alleged rights under the lease. Because the Plaintiff would 
have had no right to possession of the property, the Court can-
not see how the Plaintiff was damaged beyond not receiving the 
increased rental amount. On this point, the Court is persuaded 
by Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952), which (contrary 
to the Plaintiff's reply memorandum at 8) very clearly addresses 
the issue of whether treble damages for unlawful detainer are 
appropriate when a non-party to the suit enjoys possession of 
the subject property. While the cases are distinguishable on 
some factual points, the fact of the matter remains that 
1
 The Court is aware that PRS, Inc.'s name has subsequently changed, but will 
continue to refer to the corporation which was party to the lease as PRS, 
Inc., as stated in the lease. 
C?.-)/i 
so long as [PRS, Inc.] remained in possession, it is diffi-
cult to see how [Mr. Hunting] could be damaged by that fact 
that [PRS, LLC] remained there. Even if [the LLC] had 
moved, [Mr. Hunting] would have had no right to possession 
of the premises as against [the Corporation]. [Mr. Hunt-
ing], therefore, suffered no actual damage. 
See jLd. at 449. Therefore, on this basis, the Court hereby de-
nies Plaintiff's request for any treble damages in this matter. 
On this issue of costs and court fees, the Court will award 
$174.50 to the Plaintiff as the prevailing party. 
III. Defendant's Motions to Strike 
A. The May 02, 2007 Hunting Affidavit 
The Court has reviewed the Defendant's motion as it relates 
to the May 02, 2007 Hunting affidavit and will grant the motion 
as follows. The Court hereby strikes: 1) paragraphs four in its 
entirety; and 2) paragraph five in its entirety. The Court 
strikes these provisions on the ground that they contain legal 
argument or opinion which exceeds the permissible scope of an 
affidavit. If the Plaintiff believes there are facts contained 
within those paragraphs which should be brought before the 
Court, Plaintiff is instructed to submit a new affidavit limited 
only to facts, and not containing conclusion, argument, or opin-
ion. 
B. The May 02, 2007 Dyer Affidavit 
The Court has reviewed the Defendant's motion as it relates 
to the May 02, 2007 Dyer affidavit and will grant the motion as 
follows. The Court hereby strikes: 1) paragraphs three in its 
entirety; 2) paragraph four in its entirety; and 3) the final 
sentence of paragraph six. If the Plaintiff feels there are 
facts contained within those paragraphs which should be brought 
before the Court, Plaintiff is instructed to submit a new affi-
davit limited to facts, and not containing conclusion, argument, 
or opinion. 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby or-
ders that: 
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on Attorney Fees is MOOT; 
2) Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Damages is GRANTED IN PART, 
as follows: 
a) the Plaintiff is awarded $88,000.00 as unpaid rent; 
b) the Plaintiff is awarded $0.00 as treble damages; and 
c) the Plaintiff is awarded $174.50 as costs; and 
3) Defendant's Motions to Strike are GRANTED IN PART, as out-
lined in the Court's ruling. 
The Court hereby orders the Plaintiff to prepare an order 
of final judgment based upon this ruling and order, and to sub-
mit it to the Court for signature per the procedures outlined in 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ited t h i s 1/ Dated t h i s K day of U M / / r , 2007 
OHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
/^ pfr 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
m i*&& 
RAY HUNTING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, 
Defendant. 
L.L.C., 
RULING 
CASE NO. 050800484 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Issue of Damages Pursuant to Rule 56 
U.R.C.P. (hereinafter ''Defendant's Damages Motion"), filed April 
06, 2007, and accompanied by supporting memorandum. The matter 
having been fully briefed, and having received a request for de-
cision, the Court now rules upon the motion. 
First, the Court notes that the Defendant's Memorandum in 
support of the Damages Motion should contain, as a motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of damages, a statement of mate-
rial facts, per Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Lacking a statement of facts, it is difficult for the 
Court to rule that, as a matter of law, there are no genuine is-
sues of material fact. It also makes it difficult, if not im-
possible, for the opposing party to raise issues of fact to 
overcome the motion for summary judgment. 
Here, the Court believes that there are genuine issues as 
to damages. While the Court is not convinced that the Plaintiff 
is entitled to the amount sought, the Court cannot conclude that 
the Plaintiff has not been damaged to some extent by the Defen-
dant in this matter. 
yf.rl / 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby de-
nies the Defendant's motion. 
Dat ed this ty day of , 2007 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050800484 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail PHILLIP W DYER 
Attorney PLA 
136 S MAIN STSTE 221 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
By Hand DANIEL S SAM 
Dated this f)l day of / I } llu , 20 C / 
"t 
/ /' (ML L. Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OE UTAH 
RAY HUNTING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, 
Defendant. 
-
L . L . C . , 
RULING AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 050800484 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for 
reconsideration, filed November 14, 2006. The matter came be-
fore the Court for oral argument on the motion on January 30, 
2007. At that hearing the Court considered: 1) the merits of 
the motion to reconsider; 2) the prospective application of the 
Court's earlier October 17, 2006 order regarding discovery; 3) 
the reasonableness of Plaintiff's attorney fees as they relate 
to Plaintiff's earlier motion to compel; and 4) the joinder of 
other interested parties to this lawsuit. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the Court ruled from the bench on the issues. Hav-
ing given the matter further consideration, the Court decided to 
issue a written ruling instead. Therefore, having reviewed the 
motion and memoranda submitted to the Court, and having consid-
ered the arguments of the parties as presented at the hearing, 
the Court now rules as follows. 
I. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
The Court will deny the Defendant's motion for reconsidera-
tion. After entertaining oral argument on the issue, the Court 
is unconvinced that the order granting Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment should be set aside. The Court's previous rul-
ing and order will therefore stand unchanged. 
That said, the Court understands that by denying the Defen-
dant's motion for consideration, the Plaintiff will want the 
Court to enter an order of restitution, restoring the subject 
property to the Plaintiff. In a typical eviction case, the 
proper course of action would be to issue such an order. How-
ever, in this case, there are other parties presently in posses-
sion of the subject property whose rights have not yet been ad-
judicated. At least one of these parties has entered into a 
lease agreement with the Plaintiff. It would be wholly improper 
for the Court to issue an order restoring possession to the 
Plaintiff in possible contravention of rights and obligations 
flowing from the lease. Therefore, the Court will deny the De-
fendant's motion for reconsideration, and puts the Plaintiff on 
notice that the Court is unwilling at this time to issue an or-
der of restitution. 
II. PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OE OCTOBER 17, 2006 ORDER 
On October 17,2006, the Court issued an order allowing ad-
ditional discovery in the matter. This October 17, 2006 order 
was entered prior to the Court granting Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. At the January 30, 2007 hearing, the Plain-
tiff stated that if the motion for summary judgment remained un-
disturbed, the Plaintiff would not seek to perform the addi-
tional discovery contemplated by the October 17, 2006 order. 
Because the motion for reconsideration is denied, the order 
granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is undisturbed. 
Therefore, the October 17, 2006 order is no longer necessary and 
the Court will therefore set aside that order, to the extent 
that it permits additional discovery to be conducted. This rul-
ing also disposes of the Defendant's objections to the discovery 
sought by the Plaintiff, filed September 29, 2006, and October 
04, 2006. 
III. REASONABLENESS OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY FEES 
The Court awarded attorney fees to the plaintiff for having 
to file a motion to compel discovery. Although the Court has 
just ruled that the October 17, 2006 order has no prospective 
application as far as future,discovery is concerned, the Court 
will enforce the order as to the award of attorney fees. The 
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit on those fees. The Defen-
dant objected to the reasonableness of the stated fees. Having 
considered the matter, the Court will order that the amount 
stated in the Plaintiff's affidavit be reduced to $1,000.00. 
IV. JOINDER OF THIRD PARTIES 
The Court instructed the parties to prepare to address the 
issue of joining other seeming necessary parties to this law-
suit. Having review the argument of the parties and the appli-
cable law, the Court is still not convinced that PRS, Inc. is 
not a necessary party to this suit, insofar as it appears to the 
Court that the Plaintiff desires to re-enter and obtain full 
possession of the subject property. In granting Plaintiff's mo-
tion for summary judgment, the Court had only adjudicated the 
rights between Ray Hunting and PRS, LLC. However, as stated 
above, an adjudication of those rights does not allow the Court 
to restore complete possession of the subject property to the 
Plaintiff. It is clear to the Court that there exists a lease 
between PRS, Inc. (now PRSM, Inc.) and the Plaintiff. The 
rights and obligations that flow from that lease agreement have 
not been adjudicated at this time. It appears that PRSM, Inc. 
and PRS Holdings, Inc. have been in possession of the subject 
property this entire time. Yet none of those parties have been 
brought within the jurisdiction of this Court through service of 
process or appearance in the matter. 
The Plaintiff spent considerable time at the January 30, 
2007 hearing explaining several cases, copies of which were de-
livered to the Court at the hearing. Having now reviewed those 
cases, the Court finds that Tanner v. Lawler, 305 P.2d 882 (Utah 
1957) is distinguishable from the present case on numerous 
grounds, the most obvious of which is that the alleged owner of 
the property (Reichert) was: 1) not in actual possession of the 
property; and 2) intervened in the suit therefore submitting to 
the jurisdiction of the court. Here, it appears to the Court 
that PRS entities (including PRS, LLC; PRSM, Inc.; and PRS Hold-
ings, Inc.) have all enjoyed concurrent possession of the sub-
ject property and that only PRS, LLC's rights have been adjudi-
cated at this time, the other parties not having been joined to 
the action. 
^-M^r 
The Court further finds that Pinckney v. Snidemanf 2000 UT 
App 275, an unpublished decision, is distinguishable on the 
grounds that, at the time suit was brought, Snideman was appar-
ently in sole possession of the property in that case. Here, 
there is ample reason to believe that PRS, LLC is not the sole 
party in possession of the subject property. The fact that PRS, 
LLC's name appears on the rent check does not, in and of itself, 
make PRS, LLC the only tenant, especially in light of the lease 
agreement executed between the Plaintiff and PRS, Inc., which 
rights and obligations have not yet been adjudicated. 
The Court also considered the case of Pearce v. Shurtz, 270 
P.2d 442 (Utah 1954, and concludes that it too is distinguish-
able from the matter at bar. In Pearce, Call sold a ranch to 
Lewellen, who subsequently assigned his interest in a bond for 
deed to Shurtz, who assigned half of his interest to Wright. 
Lewellen apparently maintained liability on a promissory note. 
Shurtz and Wright then collectively assigned their interests to 
Johnson. Then Call (the original owner) assigned his interest 
in the promissory note for the ranch to Pearce, who then sued 
Shurtz, Wright, and Johnson for unlawful detainer. Looking at 
the matter in light of those facts, it is not difficult to see 
how Pearce is distinguishable from the present action. In every 
instance, there was an assignment of rights from one party to 
the next. Further, the very language of the case makes it im-
possible for the Court to rely upon it in the way urged by the 
Plaintiff. The Court stated, "Unlawful detainer, however, is an 
action to remove a tenant from possession and is primarily 
against the person in possession." Because Lewellen was appar-
ently not in possession of the property, it was not required 
that Lewellen be joined as a necessary party, and Pearce could 
lawfully proceed against Shurtz, Wright, and Johnson (i.e., the 
parties in possession). Here, as stated above, the Defendant 
and the other PRS entities appear to have enjoyed concurrent 
possession of the subject property. 
Therefore, the Court concludes as follows. The rights of 
PRS, LLC have been adjudicated, the Court finding that PRS, LLC 
was lawfully served with an increase in rent. Failing to pay 
the increase in rent, the Plaintiff brought suit against the LLC 
for unlawful detainer. The Court's order granting Plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment effectively adjudicated the rights 
of the Plaintiff against the LLC. However, the rights of the 
Plaintiff against the lessee, PRS, Inc. have not been the sub-
ject of this Court's attention at t;h.is point. Therefore, it 
would be improper for this Court to issue an order granting 
Plaintiff the right to retake possession of the property until 
such time as the rights under the lease have been adjudicated. 
Finally, the issue of Plaintiff s damages resulting from 
PRS, LLC's unlawful detainer will be reserved for future hear-
ing. 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that Defendant's motion for reconsideration is DENIED; the Octo-
ber 17, 2006 order has no prospective application as to future 
discovery, but the Court's award of attorney fees on Plaintiff's 
motion to compel survives; the Defendant is ordered to pay 
$1,000.00 in attorney fees to Plaintiff; and the Court will not 
enter an order of restitution of the subject property until the 
rights of all tenants have been adjudicated by process of law. 
Dated this /V day of 2007 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050800484 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail PHILLIP W DYER 
Attorney PLA 
136 S MAIN STSTE 221 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
By Hand DANIEL S SAM 
Dated this Q ? ^ day of h y ^ 20 ft ^  . 
tH/U-UwL, 
Deputy Cqtfrt Clerk 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RAY HUNTING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, 
Defendant. 
L.L.C., 
RULING 
CASE NO. 050800484 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
T h i s m a t t e r i s b e f o r e t h e Cour t on t h e C o u r t ' s own i n i t i a -
t i v e . The Cour t has p r e v i o u s l y s e t t h i s m a t t e r f o r h e a r i n g on: 
1) D e f e n d a n t ' s mot ion t o r e c o n s i d e r and 2) t h e p r o s p e c t i v e a p -
p l i c a t i o n of t h e C o u r t ' s Oc tober 17, 2006 r u l i n g on P l a i n t i f f ' s 
mot ion t o compel d i s c o v e r y . Th i s h e a r i n g w i l l be h e l d on J a n u -
a r y 30, 2007, as n o t i c e d . 
I . THE SECOND PROPOSED ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
The Cour t ha s r e c e i v e d a second p r o p o s e d Order of R e s t i t u -
t i o n , s u b m i t t e d by t h e P l a i n t i f f . The Cour t has p r e v i o u s l y r e -
c e i v e d , e n t e r e d , and s t r u c k an Order of R e s t i t u t i o n i n t h i s m a t -
t e r . Having r e v i e w e d t h e r e c o r d s , and a c c o r d i n g t o p l e a d i n g s 
s u b m i t t e d by b o t h p a r t i e s , t h e Cour t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e a r e 
t h i r d p a r t i e s which have not been made p a r t of t h i s l a w s u i t , b u t 
which have r i g h t s r e l a t e d t o t h e u n d e r l y i n g p r o p e r t y . In p a r -
t i c u l a r , t h e Cour t i s aware t h a t t h e r e i s a l e a s e be tween t h e 
P l a i n t i f f and P i p e Renewal S e r v i c e , I n c . , 1 which l e a s e was t h e 
1
 The Cour t i s aware t h a t t h e c u r r e n t l e g a l name of P ipe Renewal S e r v i c e , I n c . 
i s P ipe Renewal S e r v i c e Management, I n c . However, f o r c o n v e n i e n c e , t h e Cour t 
w i l l r e f e r t o P ipe Renewal S e r v i c e Management, I n c . and P ipe Renewal S e r v i c e 
I n c . a s PRS, I n c . Thus , when n e c e s s a r y , t h e Cour t w i l l r e f e r t o t h e Defen-
dan t a s PRS, LLC, and t o t h e l e s s e e as PRS, I n c . 
crux of the Defendant's motion to dismiss and opposition to 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In fact, both parties, 
to some extent, have relied upon the existence of PRS, Inc. in 
arguing their positions. In addition, there may be other third 
parties beside PRS, Inc. which have certain rights to the under-
lying property. Because these other third parties have not been 
made party to this lawsuit, those rights have not yet been adju-
dicated. Therefore, the Court is reluctant to issue an order at 
this time restoring possession of the subject property to the 
Plaintiff. 
The Court is puzzled as to why these other parties (par-
ticularly PRS, Inc.) have not been made part of this lawsuit. 
It would appear that the Plaintiff is seeking to regain exclu-
sive possession of the subject property, yet the Plaintiff has 
failed to join at least one seemingly necessary party. On the 
other hand, the Defendant appears to be attempting to assert the 
lease rights of PRS, Inc. on behalf of the Defendant, but has 
made no effort to involve PRS, Inc. in this lawsuit. PRS, Inc. 
has also not attempted to intervene and assert its own rights. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in relevant portion, states 
A person who is subject to service of process and whose 
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the 
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be ac-
corded among those already parties . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). Further, "If he has not been so joined, 
the court shall order that he be made a party." _Id. Based upon 
the foregoing, the Court is prepared to order that PRS, Inc. be 
joined in this lawsuit. If there are other parties which should 
also be joined as necessary parties, the Court instructs the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant to bring that to the Court's atten-
tion. 
Unless the parties can adequately explain why PRS, Inc. 
should not be joined as a necessary party, the Court will order 
that PRS, Inc. be joined per Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Because this matter has previously been set 
for oral argument, the Court will forebear on issuing such an 
order at this time, but hereby instructs the parties to be pre-
pared to present the Court with argument on the issue of joining 
all necessary third parties. 
II. ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO OCTOBER 17, 2006 ORDER 
In Plaintiff's recent memorandum in opposition to Defen-
dant's request for clarification (filed December 26, 2006), the 
Plaintiff requests that, "In the event that the Defendant de-
cides to file a request for hearing [on the issue of attorney 
fees], Plaintiff has no objection to the Court hearing the same 
during oral argument . . . on January 30, 2007." Mem. in opp., 
p.3 n.5. In the interest of efficiency, the Court hereby puts 
the parties on notice that, should the Defendant request a hear-
ing on that issue, the Court will entertain argument on the same 
at the January 30, 2007 hearing. 
III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING FOR DAMAGES, PURSUANT TO NOVEMBER 01, 
20 06 ORDER 
Finally, in the event that the Court's November 01, 2007 
order granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is not 
set aside as a result of the January 30, 2007 hearing, an evi-
dentiary hearing on damages will be scheduled at a future date. 
Dated this *&h day otydUfl , 2007. 
Br THE oG^r 
(/JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050800484 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail PHILLIP W DYER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
136 S MAIN STSTE 221 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Mail DANIEL S SAM 
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319 W 100 S STE A 
VERNAL UT 84 07 8 
Dated t h i s £^_ day of I /(iLii iL+LOf 20 ^ 7 , 
CilCL 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RAY HUNTING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, 
Defendant. 
L.L.C., 
RULING 
CASE NO. 050800484 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Request for 
Clarification, filed December 11, 2006, and Defendant's request 
for oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, filed No-
vember 14, 2006. 
The Court will grant the request for oral argument and the 
matter will be set for a hearing. 
Further, in light of the fact that the Court has granted 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the Court has questions 
regarding the necessity of extending discovery as ordered on Oc-
tober 17, 2006. Therefore, the Court will entertain argument 
from the parties as to the necessity of further discovery at the 
same time as the oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Recon-
sider. After the hearing, the Court will clarify the prospec-
tive application of the October 17, 2006 order. 
Dated this day of 2006. 
N R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050800484 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Dated this / / day of 
Mail PHILLIP W DYER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
136 S MAIN STSTE 221 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
By Hand DANIEL S SAM 
Lift , 20 00 . 
Deput y Court Clerk 
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PILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
NOV 0 9 2006 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
BY CUJU . DEPUTY m_ 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RAY HUNTING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 050800484 
Judge: John R. Anderson 
£/(« {'[6^ 
Motion to strike and rescind order is granted based on Defendant's memorandum in 
support and on clear language of Rule 7(b) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.. 
Dated this i  <\h day of qdf, , 2006. 
Honorable John R. Anderson 
District Court Judge 
^r-2 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050800484 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail PHILLIP W DYER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
136 S MAIN STSTE 221 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
By Hand DANIEL S SAM 
Dated this day of ^ Mrf/frW^I. , 20 CU . 
4L \dUWL KVl kAxAJtrti %1L 
Deputy Court Cl^erk 
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LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
CAREY A. SEAGER (9463) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
221 Keams Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 363-5000 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
'^3 
RAY HUNTING, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
VS. 
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC, a Utah ; 
Limited Liability Company ] 
Defendant. ; 
) ORDER OF RESTrf UTION 
) Case No. 050800484 
) Judge John R. Anderson 
TO THE DEFENDANT: PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC 
QjfrJ ATTN: WILLIAM LAUF, Registered Agent 
Within feg€H^-) business days following service of a copy of this Order of Restitution, 
the Defendant must vacate the premises located at 5500 East 5750 South, Vernal, Utah 84079, 
remove the Defendant's personal property, and restore possession of the premises to the Plaintiff, 
or be forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable. Furthermore, the Defendant has the right to a 
hearing to contest the manner of the enforcement of the Order of Restitution. A form for 
requesting a hearing, together with a copy of this Order of Restitution, is served upon the 
Defendant in accordance with Utah Code Annotated 78-36-6 (1997). 
If the Defendant fails to comply with the Order of Restitution, the sheriff or constable 
may, at the direction of the Plaintiff, enter the premises by force using the least destructive means 
possible to remove the Defendant, the Defendant's personal property, and any other 
person(s)/entity(ies) claiming a right to occupancy through the Defendant. 
TO THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE: 
If the Defendant, after being served with a copy of the Order of Restitution m accordance 
with Utah Code Annotated 78-36-10.5(2)(a) (2003) fails to comply with the foregoing Order of 
Restitution within three (3) days after service, you are commanded to, at the Plaintiffs direction, 
enter the premises by force using the least destructive means possible to remove the Defendant, 
any personal property of the Defendant, and any other person(s)/entity(ies) claiming a right to 
occupancy through the Defendant. 
DATED this 1 ^ day of ^Jt & jT\ 2006. 
IONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
E \Cbent\Huntmg\Order of Restitution 
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Exhibit L 
RAY HUNTING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC, a 
limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 050800484 
Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: 
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 22, 2006, 
and accompanied by supporting memorandum and affidavit. Defendant's 
opposition was filed October 10, 2006. Plaintiff's reply was filed 
October 19, 2006. Notice to submit the motion for decision was filed 
October 20, 2006. 
2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P., 
filed September 25, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum. 
Plaintiff's opposition was filed October 10, 2006. Defendant's reply 
was filed October 19, 2006. Notice to submit the motion for decision 
was filed October 30, 2006. 
The Court has reviewed the motions and their respective 
memoranda. Having considered the matter, and having received notice 
to submit the motions for decision, the Court now rules upon the 
motions. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the 
Plaintiff's motion, but will reserve the issue of damages pending a 
hearing on that issue. The Defendant's motion will be denied. 
I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in relevant part, state, ". . 
. [w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by 
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affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah 
R. Civ. P. Rule 56(e). The Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
was accompanied by affidavit and deposition citations setting forward 
specific facts upon which the Court could find summary judgment 
appropriate. The Defendant has not responded by affidavit or 
established specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Rather, it appears to the Court that the Defendant has based 
its entire defense on a lease agreement entered into by the Plaintiff 
and a non-party entity, Pipe Renewal Service, Inc. Where a party 
fails to set forth facts showing a genuine issue of material fact, 
"Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party 
failing to file such a response." Td. Therefore, the Court's 
attention turns to whether summary judgment is appropriate. 
As pointed out by the Plaintiff in his reply memorandum in 
support of the motion for summary judgment, the Defendant has not 
disputed that the Plaintiff served the Defendant both 1) a notice of 
rent increase and 2) a notice to vacate after the Defendant had failed 
to pay the increased amount of rent. Rather, the Defendant argues 
that notices were received, but that such notice constitutes a breach 
of the lease agreement between the Plaintiff and Pipe Renewal Service, 
Inc., a non-party to this lawsuit. The Defendant has not offered any 
evidence to support the fact that the Defendant, Pipe Renewal Service, 
LLC, is bound by the terms of that lease agreement or that the 
Plaintiff is obligated to deal with Pipe Renewal Service, LLC, in the 
same way that the Plaintiff is required to deal with Pipe Renewal 
Service, Inc. The Court, having reviewed the record, is of the 
opinion that the lease agreement, as it has been submitted in regard 
to the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, is irrelevant. The 
Defendant is not party to that contract and the Plaintiff is not 
obligated to deal with the Defendant based upon the terms expressed 
therein. Without the lease agreement argument to fall back on, the 
Defendant has done nothing to contest the Plaintiff's right to summary 
judgment or to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
The Court is convinced by the argument and the citations to Utah 
law that the Plaintiff is entitled to unilaterally raise rents when 
the landlord and tenant have failed to memorialize the lease in 
writing. In such an instance, the lease is month-to-month. If the 
Defendant was concerned about a unilateral rent increase, the 
Defendant could have negotiated with the Plaintiff and sought to 
reduce the lease agreement to writing. The Court has not been 
presented with any evidence indicating that the Plaintiff is not 
legally entitled to unilaterally increase rent in this case. Because 
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the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to increase rent, and 
because the Defendant concedes receiving notice of the rent increase 
and failing to pay the increased amount, and because the Plaintiff 
served the Defendant with a notice to vacate, and because the 
Defendant did not pay the increased rent and did not vacate, the Court 
can lawfully conclude that the Defendant is in unlawful detainer of 
the subject property. Therefore, the Court will grant the Plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment. However, the Court is concerned with the 
amount of damages as calculated by the Plaintiff. Therefore, the 
Court will order that a hearing be held on the issue of damages. 
II. THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
By granting the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the 
Court has implicitly denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The 
Plaintiff and the Defendant correctly point out that "If, on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in 
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 12(c). Here, the Court will exclude the lease 
agreement, and will treat the motion as a motion to dismiss. The 
Court finds that the Plaintiff has not failed to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. Even if the Court were not to exclude 
the lease agreement, the Court would find the lease agreement to be 
irrelevant as to the parties to this suit. Therefore, whether the 
motion is treated as a motion to dismiss or as a motion for summary 
judgment, the Defendant's argument ultimately fails. Simply put, the 
Plaintiff has not failed to state a claim and nothing in the record 
creates a genuine issue of material fact. 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, the 
Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED, and the matter will be set 
for hearing on the issue of damages. 
Dated this /> f day of "71 dU* f \ , 200<£\ 
•HN R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050800484 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail PHILLIP W DYER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
136 S MAIN STSTE 221 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Dated this / day of 
By Hand DANIEL S SAM 
1 1 DO ™QL 
J f^i .-
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF' UTAH 
RAY HUNTING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC, a 
limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 050800484 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel Discovery and to Conduct Limited Discovery, filed Septem-
ber 15, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum and affi-
davit. The Defendant has failed to respond to the motion within 
the timeframe established by Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Having reviewed the matter, and having re-
ceived a notice to submit the motion for decision, the Court now 
rules upon the motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court 
will grant the motion. 
First, the Defendant has failed to respond to the motion. 
For this reason alone, the Court is inclined to grant the mo-
tion. Further, a review of the deposition transcript reveals 
that the Defendant did agree to provide the requested materials 
at the July 31, 2006 deposition of Mr. Lauf. It appears to the 
Court that the Plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to contact 
the Defendant and request the agreed upon materials. The Court 
finds that the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is proper under the 
circumstances and will grant the motion. 
// 
**>nll 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the Plaintiffs motion is GRANTED. The Defendant is or-
dered to produce the materials as outlined in the Plaintiff's 
memorandum in support of the motion (PL's Mem. of P. & A. in 
Supp. of PL's Mot. 5). The Court also orders a limited exten-
sion of time for the deposition of Boyce Coombs, Boyce Coombs, 
P.C., and Defendant's tax attorney. The parties are instructed 
to submit a Proposed Second Amended Scheduling Order with re-
vised dates for the Court's signature. Finally, the Court or-
ders that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff's fees and costs in-
curred in bringing the motion to compel. The Plaintiff is in-
structed to submit a proposed order on fees and costs to the De-
fendant. The Defendant will have 30 days to request a hearing, 
if desired, on that proposed order. 
Dated this it day of 2006. 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050800484 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail PHILLIP W DYER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
136 S MAIN STSTE 221 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
By Hand DANIEL S SAM 
Dated this day of \{/(±£f> hi'A^, 20 PC • 
YUfU 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33249409 (Utah App.), 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33249409) 
Pinckney v. Snideman 
Utah App.,2000. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Joy PINCKNEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
John David SNIDEMAN, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 990944-CA. 
Oct. 5, 2000. 
Richard L. Tretheway, Springville, for appellant. 
Thomas J. Klc, Salt Lake City, for appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, DAVIS, and THORNE, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (NOT FOR OFFI-
CIAL PUBLICATION) 
DAVIS. 
*1 Pinckney appeals both the trial court's ruling 
that Snideman was not the real party in interest and 
the trial court's award of attorney fees to Snideman. 
We reverse and remand for a new trial on Pinck-
ney's claim for unlawful detainer. 
Pinckney brought an unlawful detainer action as as-
signee of the beneficial interest under a trust deed 
executed by Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. (Prodigy) as 
trustor. In the event of default by Prodigy, the trust 
deed provided that the beneficiary could take pos-
session of the property and sue for rents, issues, and 
profits. 
Pinckney argues that the trial court erred in con-
cluding that Snideman was not a proper party in the 
unlawful detainer action. The trial court's interpret-
ation of the statute defining unlawful detainer is a 
question of law which we review for correctness. 
See Cache County v. Bern, 1999 UT App 134, % 8, 
978P.2d 1043. 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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"A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, 
is guilty of an unlawful detainer ... when he contin-
ues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after 
default in the payment of any rent...."Utah Code 
Ann. §78-36-3(l)(1999). 
"Unlawful detainer, however, is an action to re-
move a tenant from possession and is primarily 
against the person in possession. It is not similar to 
a quiet title action wherein anyone with any interest 
should be joined. Neither is it similar to an action 
upon the promissory note."Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 
2d 124, 270 P.2d 442,443 (1954). Furthermore, 
[n]o person other than the tenant of the premises ... 
shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding 
... nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff 
be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who 
might have been made a party defendant; but when 
it appears that any of the parties served with pro-
cess or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, 
judgment shall be rendered against those parties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7(1) (1999). 
Pinckney filed his complaint of unlawful detainer 
against Snideman because Snideman was in posses-
sion of the property.FN1 Therefore, we reverse the 
judgment of the trial court because Snideman was a 
real party in interest and an appropriate defendant 
in the unlawful detainer proceeding. 
FN1. Snideman testified that the property 
in question was his personal address and 
that he was living at that address. The trial 
court made no finding relative to the cir-
cumstances under which Snideman pos-
sessed the property. 
Pinckney also argues that the trial court erred in 
awarding attorney fees to Snideman because there 
was no contract between Pinckney and Snideman 
providing for the award of attorney fees. 
"[W]hether attorney fees are recoverable in an ac-
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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tion is a question of law, which we review for cor-
rectness." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 
(Utah 1998). Generally, kt[i]n Utah, attorney fees 
are awardable only if authorized by statute or by 
contract."D/x/e State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 
985, 988 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court awarded Snideman attorney fees 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (1999) 
based upon the attorney fees provision in the trust 
deed and trust deed note. Section 78-27-56.5 
provides: 
*2 A court may award costs and attorney's fees to 
either party that prevails in a civil action based 
upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the 
provisions of the promissory note, written contract, 
or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (1999). 
Here, there was no promissory note, written con-
tract, or any other writing between Snideman and 
Pinckney. The note and trust deed were between 
Pinckney and Prodigy, the court made no finding 
relative to a lease or agreement between defendant 
and Prodigy providing for attorney fees, see id. § 
78-36-10(3) (1999), and Pickney made no claim for 
fees under the trust or note. Therefore, the trial 
court erred in awarding attorney fees under the re-
ciprocal provisions of section 78-27-56.5. Further-
more, in light of our ruling, Snideman is no longer 
a prevailing party, and thus, he is not entitled to at-
torney fees under section 78-27-56.5. 
Thus, we reverse the trial court's ruling that 
Snideman was not the real party in interest, we re-
verse the court's award of attorney fees, and we re-
mand for a new trial on Pinckney's claim of unlaw-
ful detainer.™2 
FN2. In light of our ruling, we do not ad-
dress the issues raised by Snideman con-
cerning the inadequacy of Pinckney's brief, 
the preservation of Pinckney's claims, the 
exclusion of evidence, Pinckney's marshal-
ing burden, and Snideman's request for 
damages on appeal. 
GREENWOOD, P.J., and THORNE, J., concur. 
Utah App.,2000. 
Pinckney v. Snideman 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33249409 (Utah 
App.), 2000 UT App 275 
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